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EASEMENTS IMPLIED IN A GRANT — AWAY WITH 
‘CONTINUOUS AND APPARENT’
GREG TAYLOR*
In Wheeldon v Burrows,1 the law on implied grants of easements was 
pronounced to be that a grant would be recognised if the easement was 
‘continuous and apparent’ or reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of 
the land, and used at the time of the grant for the bene t of the land granted. 
Ever since, there has been a controversy about whether the word highlighted 
actually means “and”. But there has been no in-depth consideration of the 
purpose which the ‘continuous and apparent’ requirement is supposed 
to serve. This article concludes that it serves no purpose at all, is often 
ignored by the courts, is not justi ed for historical or any other reasons, 
is not binding as part of the ratio decidendi of Wheeldon nor part of the 
broader contribution of that case to the development of the common law, 
and accordingly should be deleted from the discussion.
I  INTRODUCTION
As long ago as 1868 Cockburn CJ, speaking on behalf of the Queen’s Bench,
said that: 
Whatever disadvantages attach to a system of unwritten law, and of these 
we are fully sensible, it has at least this advantage, that its elasticity enables 
those who administer it to adapt it to the varying conditions of society, and 
to the requirements and habits of the age in which we live, so as to avoid 
the inconsistencies and injustice which arise when the law is no longer 
in harmony with the wants and usages and interests of the generation to 
which it is immediately applied.2
This was a view which informed his Lordship’s stance in what was then the 
coming debate over the possibility of a criminal code for England.3 Nevertheless, 
his Lordship delivered this dictum in a defamation case, and such wisdom as is 
contained in it is certainly not to be con ned to any one area of law.
Certainly the 20th century, even in slower-moving  elds such as property law in 
which certainty is often highly prized, provided several memorable examples of 
judicial updating of the law. In this country the most prominent was undoubtedly 
1 (1879) 12 Ch D 31 (‘Wheeldon’).
2  Wason v Walter (1868) LR 4 QB 73, 93.
3 Sir Rupert Cross, ‘The Making of English Criminal Law: (6) Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’ [1978] 
Criminal Law Review 652, 657f.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University. The author wishes to thank Angus McLeod for 
his comments on a draft; the usual disclaimers apply.
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Mabo v Queensland [No 2].4 Even outside the realm in which conservatives vie 
with bolder judicial spirits and cries of judicial activism are heard, however, 
there is clearly something to be said for not tying oneself down to the words of a 
statute which may be drafted poorly or with insuf cient foresight of the types of 
cases that may later arise, but rather leaving the door open to gradual changes as 
society’s needs develop.
But there is also something to be said for the certainty and reliability of a statute. 
This is certainly the case if the very wording of a common law rule remains 
uncertain because case law does not supply one authoritative text for it.
It beggars belief that there is a common law rule which has now been in existence 
for a century and a third in which it is uncertain whether the word ‘or’ actually 
means “or” or (!), rather, “and”. The  rst rule in Wheeldon v Burrows5 states — 
with the ‘or’ in question highlighted — that:
on the grant by the owner of a tenement or part of that tenement as it is 
then used and enjoyed,[6] there will pass to the grantee all those continuous 
and apparent easements (by which, of course, I mean quasi easements), or, 
in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable 
enjoyment of the property granted, and which have been and are at the 
time of the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the bene t of the 
part granted.7
There is a great deal of authority which suggests that ‘or’ here must actually be 
read as “and”, although there is also authority to the effect that ‘or’ means what 
it says.8 So must an easement used by the owners of the entirety before the grant 
be both ‘continuous and apparent’ and ‘reasonably necessary to the enjoyment 
of the property granted’, or is it suf cient if it meets just one criterion? A glance 
at comparative law provides little assistance, for the solutions adopted elsewhere 
also differ on this point, just as the authorities from England and Australia do. 
While, on the one hand, the equivalent unwritten rule of Scots law manages 
entirely without ‘continuous and apparent’,9 the codi cation of Wheeldon in s 13 
4 (1992) 175 CLR 1; but for a convincing defence of the prior law, see Peter Connolly, ‘Theory of 
Universal and Absolute Crown Ownership’ (1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 9, 11f.
5 (1879) 12 Ch D 31.
6 Wheeldon does not apply to the grant of a contractual licence: Hinkley v Star City (2010) 15 BPR 28, 
983; on this topic, see Greg Taylor, ‘Implied Terms in Licences over Land’ (2001) 21 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 178.
7 (1879) 12 Ch D 31, 49; there is a similar statement at 58f.
8 An excellent analysis of the English authorities to 1996 may be found in Graham Ferris, ‘Problem 
Postponed: The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and Wheeler v Saunders’ [1996] 3 Web Journal of Current 
Legal Issues <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue3/ferris3.html>; see also Auerbach v Beck (1985) 6 
NSWLR 424, 443; Germain v Brar [2010] ABQB 530, [45]; Rarere v Phildagap [2011] NZHC 1810, 
[16] n 10. Despite the  rst-named author’s valiant effort at n 3 of his article, I take no account here of 
the third possibility that ‘continuous and apparent’ and ‘necessary to the reasonable enjoyment’ may 
be synonymous, as they are clearly not. An underground drain is an example of a case in which an 
easement may indeed be reasonably necessary — or even indispensable — without being continuous 
and apparent. As is pointed out below, Wheeldon was an unreserved judgment and too much weight 
should therefore not be placed on the words ‘in other words’ in the extract quoted.
9 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] 1 WLR 2620, 2629, 2656; see Bowers v Kennedy 2000 SC 555, 561.
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of the Indian Easements Act 1882 opts for ‘and’ as well as the double requirement. 
It thus ends all uncertainty in that country, but for those outside the range of that 
statute there is no such relief.
It is time that this uncertainty was put to rest. Previous analyses of this  eld have 
collected the authorities in which judges line up on one side or the other, but have 
failed to see Wheeldon in its historical context and have thus mistaken the weight 
which should be placed on the exact words of Thesiger LJ in enunciating the 
rule. In fact his Lordship was directing his mind to another question altogether. It 
would therefore be quite legitimate for us in modern times to make small textual 
amendments to his words.
Equally, however, we should not become obsessed with every word of the 
judgment as if it were a statute,10 and are at liberty to consider the question from 
 rst principles. The detail of the rule as enunciated, and the needs of modern 
times, with near-universal land registration, as well as historical factors unite to 
suggest that the preferable course is to eliminate the ‘continuous and apparent’ 
limb of the test entirely. If that seems too bold a step, the next best thing is to 
read ‘or’ as meaning what it says so that ‘continuous and apparent’ does not get 
in the way of implying easements that truly are necessary for the enjoyment of a 
granted tenement.
It may be conceded at once that one of the reasons for the doubt about the precise 
meaning of ‘or’ in the  rst rule in Wheeldon is doubtless the comparatively few 
cases in which the question has been raised. In the modern world, most easements 
are created expressly and/or pursuant to legislation on subdivisions,11 and not via 
the rules on implication into grants. Nevertheless, such cases do still arise, and 
there may well also be cases in which the rules exercise an in uence over disputes 
which never reach the courts but are settled. Furthermore, there can be a long lead 
time before cases surface, because, for example, informal arrangements are made 
for a period to cover the lack of any express easement, and they may not break 
down for some time.12 It therefore remains important to get the rule right.
II  HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF WHEELDON
It is sometimes said that the rule currently under discussion derives from an obiter 
dictum,13 given that the facts in Wheeldon involved an allegation of an implied 
reservation rather than an implied grant. It may be doubted however whether 
an obiter dictum really was involved to the extent that the case established the 
proposition that implied grants were to be available more freely than implied 
10 Cf Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 386.
11 Some of which, it may be noted parenthetically, adopts a solution rather similar to that advocated here: 
see the concluding words to the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic) s 12(2).
12 Cf Adrian Bradbrook, ‘Access to Landlocked Land: A Comparative Study of Legal Solutions’ (1983) 10 
Sydney Law Review 39, 39f.
13 See, eg, Wheeler v JJ Saunders [1996] Ch 19, 30.
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reservations. In order to illustrate this, it is necessary to place us in the legal world 
of the time before Wheeldon was decided.
Wheeldon terminated once and for all a long-running controversy involving 
much judicial debate about whether there was any difference in the law applicable 
to cases of alleged implied reservations as distinct from implied grants. The 
function of the case in the development of the common law was not to lay down 
the precise rules to govern the case of implied grants, but merely to establish 
that there was actually a difference between them and implied reservations. 
Accordingly, the precise form of the words used to describe the rules applicable 
to an alleged implied grant, as distinct from the implied reservation that was 
actually in question in Wheeldon, is indeed an obiter dictum.
The basis on which this distinction between grants and reservations is drawn is 
a familiar one: that the grantor, being in control of the terms of the grant, should 
take care to reserve what he or she needs, while no such exacting standard should 
be demanded of a grantee. In relation to property law, it might be added that a 
grantor is presumably familiar with the property and more likely to be aware of 
the easements that are required to enjoy it fully, while a grantee, being new to 
the property, is much less likely to be so familiar. Clearly exceptional cases can 
be postulated in which that is not so, but as a basis for general rule it is a valid 
hypothesis. This is all the more so given that the rule also and uncontroversially 
requires that the alleged easement should actually have been used at the time of 
the grant for the purpose in question. In this respect Wheeldon could be seen 
as a modi cation of the caveat emptor principle,14 and my suggested alternative 
justi cation will hold good even in cases where the rather schematic traditional 
one does not and the grantee is the party with the greater economic power and 
possibly even the author of the terms of the grant.
The distinction between grants and reservations can be traced back in embryo 
to the mid-17th century.15 By the middle of the 19th century however, the idea 
had caught on that an implied reservation might also be justi ed in cases where 
the proposed easement was merely apparent and continuous.16 In Pyer v Carter 
Watson B af rmed that proposition in a case involving drainage,17 and held that 
the grantee had a duty to inquire about easements. But in Suf eld v Brown18 Lord 
Westbury LC, hearing an appeal from Sir John Romilly MR who had followed 
Pyer, attacked that decision in unusually strong terms as ‘a very serious and 
alarming doctrine; ... of very recent introduction; and ... unsupported by any 
14 Having written this sentence I was pleased to see a very similar point made in Bruce Ziff, Principles of 
Property Law (Carswell, 5th ed, 2010) 383.
15 Palmer v Fletcher (1663) 1 Lev 122, 122; 83 ER 329, 329, where, on facts similar to Wheeldon’s, 
Kelynge J is certain that there is no implied reservation but merely doubts whether there is an implied 
grant; Tenant v Goldwin (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1089, 1093; 92 ER 222, 224. See also Morris v Edgington 
(1810) 3 Taunt 24, 30; 128 ER 10, 13; Ernest Firth, ‘The Quasi-Grant of Easements in English and 
Roman Law’ (1894) 10 Law Quarterly Review 323, 324.
16 The con ict is well summarised in Crossley & Sons v Lightowler (1867) LR 2 Ch App 478, 486.
17 (1857) 1 H & N 916; 156 ER 1472.
18 (1864) 4 de G J & S 185; 46 ER 888.
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reason or principle’19 as well as based on ‘an ingenious and fanciful theory’.20 The 
chief dif culty his Lordship saw in it was that it imposed an obligation to seek 
information about the use of the neighbouring property from the vendor and to 
accommodate his various uses of the property, a rule which would be entirely 
inconsistent with the idea that a vendor should not derogate from his grant. His 
Lordship traced the origin of the offending heresy (as his Lordship saw it) back 
to the  rst edition of Gale on Easements, of which more shortly, and Gale’s own 
adoption of various rules of the French Civil Code. (The Lord Chancellor also 
described Gale as ‘the late’,21 although  in fact he had over a decade’s worth of life 
left in him at this point; it must be recalled that the old practice was against citing 
living authors.) Clearly the Lord Chancellor strongly disapproved of the adoption 
of rules from the exotic French Civil Code.
This bitter controversy even found an echo in case law as far away as Ontario.22 
Its  nal resolution came in Wheeldon, in which, as already mentioned, it was 
held that Lord Westbury LC was right and there was indeed a difference between 
implied grants and implied reservations, and that easements were not to be 
implied as freely into reservations as they were into grants owing to the need not 
to allow the grantor to derogate.
The historical signi cance of Wheeldon and the fact that it was understood as 
 nally solving this dispute and disposing of the contrary opinion in Pyer is shown 
by several English,23 Canadian,24 and Australian25 cases over the succeeding 
decades when judges who had lived through the controversy and observed it in 
the light of the personalities and reputations of the various actors (only some 
of whom have been named here) recounted the dispute in later judgments. The 
resolution of the dispute was no doubt also a relief to what a contemporary 
writer called ‘bewildered practitioners, [who were] ignorant which view would 
ultimately prevail [and] had to advise their clients.’26
Accordingly Wheeldon has to be understood, in its historical context, as a case 
directed to resolving the controversy among the judiciary just mentioned rather 
than to the question of the precise requirements for an easement to be implied 
into a grant — even leaving aside the consideration that the facts of the case 
concerned an implied reservation.
19 Ibid 192; 891; and see further 195f; 892.
20 Ibid 199; 893.
21 Ibid 193; 891. 
22 Young v Wilson (1874) 21 Grant’s Chancery Rep 611.
23 Brown v Alabaster (1887) 37 Ch 490, 504f. Surprisingly, there is an echo as late as Aldridge v Wright 
[1929] 1 KB 381; [1929] 2 KB 117.
24 Attrill v Plant (1884) 10 SCR 425, 481f.
25 Nelson v Walker (1910) 10 CLR 560, 582; Taylor v Browning (1885) 11 VLR 158, 164; Billiet v 
Commercial Bank of Australasia [1906] SALR 193, 206.
26 Firth, above n 15, 326.
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It is also worth noticing that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered 
ex tempore,27 and a great deal of precision cannot be expected from an unreserved 
judgment. Thus it would arguably be quite legitimate to read ‘or’ as “and” in the 
passage indicated, and thus to convert what appear to be alternative requirements 
into cumulative. There is however another possibility: that the whole ‘apparent 
and continuous’ caper is a wrong turning.
‘Apparent and continuous’ is, in fact, the sole remnant in the modern law of the 
19th century quarrel just summarised. Lord Westbury LC succeeded in expelling 
the idea that grants and reservations were to be treated in the same way, but not 
in banishing those words. Professor A W B Simpson28 has traced the manner in 
which ‘apparent and continuous’ made its way into the common law from certain 
articles of the French Civil Code that were noticed in the  rst treatise on the 
subject of easements in English law — Gale on Easements. Professor Simpson 
shows that it is Gale’s book which alone is responsible for the addition of ‘apparent 
and continuous’ to the more recognisably common law phrase ‘reasonably 
necessary’.29 No such phrase as ‘apparent and continuous’ was known to our law 
before the publication of Gale’s book.30 Professor Simpson concludes, ‘[w]hether 
by accident or design [Thesiger LJ] failed to take the opportunity which the case 
presented of sorting the whole matter out, but instead toyed with two possible 
solutions’,31 one taken from the common law and the other from the French Civil 
Code. We are still today in that position.
Who then was Gale? A German commentator on his life and work states that he 
‘was no scholar and made no learned claims. His book is rather to be counted 
among the numerous series of those of young, ambitious barristers who wished to 
27 This is implied by the of cial law report ((1879) 12 Ch 31, 48) and con rmed by the Times, 23 June 
1879, 6.
28 A W B Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code Civile’ (1967) 83 Law Quarterly 
Review 240.
29 Ibid 245f.
30 This conclusion is also reached by Lord Blackburn in Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740, 821 
and by a search of the English Reports database: Commonwealth Legal Information Institute, English 
Reports <http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/>, which yields no results before 1809; William 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) vol 7, 334f may appear to imply that 
‘continuous and apparent’ goes back to the Year Books, but a glance at the case he cites at 335 n 1 (YB 
11 Hy VII Trin pl 6) indicates that, while the right in question (a gutter) might have met the modern 
de nition of ‘continuous and apparent’, the Court did not refer to that as a precondition of  nding that 
an easement is implied; indeed, the case is on another topic (revival of easement). For a translation of the 
case into English, see Charles Gale and T D Whatley, Treatise on the Law of Easements (S Sweet, 1st ed, 
1839) 55f. It should also be noted that Gale also wrote that ‘continuous and apparent’ and ‘reasonably 
necessary’ were alternatives and not cumulative: at 49; see Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows 
and the Code Civile’, above n 28, 242.
31 Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code Civile’, above n 28, 246. 
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make a name for themselves with often handbook-like works.’32 This is certainly 
accurate. Gale (1805–1876; he was thus 34 when his treatise  rst appeared) was 
a barrister who became a Judge of the County Court for Hampshire in 1847 (the 
year in which that Court was created), serving until 1874.33 Judge Gale is said 
to have ‘evinced a sound knowledge of law, and great tact and judgment in the 
discharge of the business. He was very highly respected by the solicitors who 
practised before him, and his decisions were rarely reversed on appeal.’34
No doubt Judge Gale was a most valuable asset to the legal system in which he 
worked, but if it is established, as it now is, that Wheeldon was not meant to be 
the last word on implication into grants as distinct from the difference between 
them and reservations, it may well be asked: why are we still applying a phrase 
plucked out of the French Civil Code by a young barrister and repeated without 
much thought in an unreserved judgment of the Court of Appeal? In order to 
con rm that ‘continuous and apparent’ is an unnecessary addition to the law, it 
will be necessary to consider,  rst, what each word means; secondly, what the 
courts are making of them; and thirdly, what, if any, purpose these requirements 
are supposed to serve.
III  MEANING AND APPLICATION OF ‘CONTINUOUS’
The meaning of ‘apparent’ in the source from which the phrase is taken, namely 
the articles of the French Civil Code, is more or less the same as the ordinary 
meaning of that word in English. The mystery surrounds what is meant by 
‘continuous’. In the French Code easements were ‘continuous’ if able to be 
exercised without repeated human intervention, and the Code itself gives water 
supply and drainage as examples; today we might well add electricity or even 
internet connectivity. Occasionally such services will, of course, need repair or 
32 Christoph Seebo, Servitus und Easement: die Rezeption des römischen Servitutenrechts in England 
(Wallstein, 2005) 109. The word translated ‘learned’ above is the word wissenschaftlich, which is often 
gravely mis-translated as ‘scienti c’ but connotes rather a body of ordered knowledge — there is no 
word quite equivalent in English. At n 51 the same author also states that he has not been able to  nd out 
anything about T D Whatley, the co-author of the  rst edition, through ‘the usual biographical means’. 
There is, however, a brief biographical note in the preface of Michael Bowles, Gale on Easements 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 13th ed, 1959). Internet searches have brought to my notice the existence (but not 
a copy) of a pamphlet by Kinnear and Fletcher entitled The Lediards and Whatleys of Gloucestershire: 
A Holst Family History (Holst Birthplace Museum, 2009), which indicates that he was a solicitor of 
Cirencester, Gloucestershire — and related to Gustav Holst. He is a barrister, however, in the London 
Standard, 22 June 1874, 7. Whether rightly or wrongly, however, the authorship of the passage in 
question is everywhere attributed to Gale and not to Whatley, including in contemporary sources; see 
Suf eld v Brown (1864) 4 de G J & S 185, 193; 46 ER 888, 891. 
33 Anonymous (1876) 20 Solicitor’s Journal 807; A W B Simpson (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the 
Common Law (Butterworths, 1984) 199f; Walford (1876) 61 Law Times 277.
34 (1876) 20 Solicitor’s Journal 807, 807.
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other forms of human intervention, but the contrast is made clear by referring to 
the non-continuous easements instanced by the Code such as rights of way.35
According to the text of the French Civil Code, easements must be continuous 
and apparent in order to be capable of acquisition by prescription as well as by 
what we should call express grant. The Code provides for what might be called 
implied grant in two cases:36 most notably, where there exists an apparent sign of 
the easement on land alienated (Article 694); in such cases nothing depends on 
whether the easement is continuous.
It is hard to see any reason why continuousness — whether repeated human 
action is required for the use of an easement or not — should matter in the context 
of implied grants either in England, France or anywhere else, and Professor A 
W B Simpson is surely right to say that nothing would be lost by dropping it 
entirely.37 It is a square peg in a round hole. It is easy to see that an apparent 
easement is more likely to be detected than a non-apparent one, and thus this 
requirement seems to ful l something in the nature of notice, but what could be 
the point of requiring a lack of continual human intervention for the enjoyment of 
an easement to be granted by implication? In the law of prescription, for which the 
French Code invented both the concept and the requirement of continuousness, 
it was presumably thought that the requirement of continuousness showed 
uninterrupted use for the requisite period of prescription, but in the context of sale 
and implied grant no-one should care about how far back into the past the right in 
question has been exercised for, or how easy it is to prove uninterrupted use for 
any period: while the Wheeldon rule requires the alleged easement to have been 
used before the grant, a house built last year will need a right of way just as much 
as one that is hundreds of years old. Implication is about the needs of the future, 
not the practice of the distant past.
Indeed, human intervention may give notice of the existence of an easement in a 
more conspicuous manner than in the case of an easement that can operate without 
human intervention: if the vendor leads the purchaser down a path through land 
proposed to be retained by the former, the purchaser will be alerted to the need 
for access along that path, but not to the need for the drain that runs under the 
path. If anything the fact that an easement is continuous may serve to conceal it. 
The requirement is thus not merely out of place; it is positively opposed to any 
conceivable purpose in the law of implied grant.
35 Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code Civile’, above n 28, 241f, 244f; Charles 
Harpum, Stuart Bridge and Martin Dixon, Megarry & Wade’s Law of Real Property (Sweet & Maxwell, 
7th ed, 2008), 1249f express the same idea by referring to rights that are enjoyed passively as distinct 
from those enjoyed through personal activity. In Suf eld v Brown (1864) 4 de G J & S 185, 199; 46 ER 
888, 894, the phrase used is ‘constant and uninterrupted’ use.
36 The other being the ‘mere fanciful analogy’ criticised by Lord Westbury LC in Suf eld v Brown (1864) 
4 de G J & S 185; 46 ER 888, on which see Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code 
Civile’, above n 28, 243f.
37 Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code Civile’, above n 28, 245; see also Ben 
McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins and Sarah Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 888.
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Naturally enough, various writers and courts have attempted to  ll the requirement 
of continuousness with some relevant content by changing the meaning which 
it was originally intended to bear. Occasionally attempts are made to rescue 
‘continuous’ by proposing that it requires ‘more than merely occasional’ user.38 
This probably reduces to nothing more than ‘not merely occasionally apparent’: 
if user of some easements, such as rights of way, is not continuous in the sense of 
reasonably frequent, it will usually not be apparent either. Another concept often 
used is that of permanency:39 if this is not merely also an aspect of ‘apparent’, 
it again asks a backward-looking question rather than a forward-looking one 
adapted to the purpose of the rule we are applying.
Some courts have also abandoned the requirement entirely and ‘turned a blind 
eye’ to the fact that a right of way is not continuous in the intended sense of the 
word.40 Sometimes they even frankly admit that an easement is not continuous 
but imply it anyway .41 In Campbell v McGrath42 Barrett J stated bluntly, if with 
some exaggeration, that ‘the element of “continuity” has largely been ignored’.43 
Many cases barely, if at all, draw a distinction between ‘continuous’ and 
‘apparent’, so that continuousness is merged into and disappears into the question 
of apparency.44 Others use ‘continuous’ in its spatial rather than temporal sense 
to mean not broken into parts on the ground45 — in Millman v Ellis the Court of 
Appeal referred to the ‘continuous and unbroken area of tarmac’.46 As a matter 
of semantics this is unobjectionable, but it too is either an aspect of ‘apparent’ or 
irrelevant to the issue.
38 Peter Butt, Land Law (Law Book, 6th ed, 2010) 467; an example may be Suf eld v Brown (1864) 4 de G 
J & S 185, 199; 46 ER 888, 894.
39 Ward v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194, 225 (‘Ward’); Hardy v Herr [1965] 1 OR 102, 115 (af rmed on other 
grounds: [1965] 2 OR 801); Nelson v 1153696 Alberta [2009] ABQB 732, [213]f, [219]; Campbell v 
McGrath [2005] ANZ Conv R 433; Adrian Bradbrook and Susan MacCallum, Bradbrook and Neave’s 
Easements and Restrictive Covenants (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2011) 100; Edward Burn and 
John Cartwright, Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property (Oxford University Press, 18th 
ed, 2011) 664; cf Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 6th ed, 2009) 344, where 
the requirement is said (without citation of authority) to amount to ‘constantly available’ (emphasis in 
original).
40 Harpum, Bridge and Dixon, above n 35, 1250; see also Schwann v Cotton [1916] 2 Ch 120, 128 
(judgment af rmed Schwann v Cotton [1916] 2 Ch 459).
41 In addition to the cases about to be cited: Borman v Grif th [1930] 1 Ch 493, 499.
42 [2005] ANZ Conv R 433; appeal allowed on other grounds: McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 
229 (‘McGrath’).
43 Ibid 439. Note, however, that at 440 his Honour gives reasons, possibly intended as a  g-leaf, for 
holding that the right of way is continuous, namely that it is permanent.
44 Aldridge v Wright [1929] 2 KB 117, 124f; Donaldson v Smith [2006] EWHC B9, [23], [25]; Kung Ming 
Tak Tong v Park Solid Enterprises (2008) 11 HKCFAR 403, 428 (‘Kung Ming Tak Tong’).
45 Liddiard v Waldron [1933] 2 KB 319, 322; Loyal Luck Trading v Wah [2008] 4 HKLRD 681, 692f.
46 (1995) 71 P & CR 158, 162.
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In short, both courts and commentators pay lip service to ‘continuous’.47 It is a red 
herring and a historical mistake, and it should be removed from the discussion 
at once.48
IV  APPLICATION AND PURPOSE OF ‘APPARENT’
Recently a number of appeal courts throughout the common law world have also 
begun to question the place of ‘apparent’ as well, or at least to pass over it in 
silence.49 
In Wilcox v Richardson the Court of Appeal for New South Wales mentioned 
Thesiger LJ’s ‘continuous and apparent’ but virtually refused to apply it,50 holding 
that an easement for the use of a right of way and a  sh- lleting area attached to a 
shop was ‘continuous and apparent’ even though some of the facilities in question 
showed no ‘physical features apparent on inspection.’51 To put the matter more 
precisely, it could not have been said in that case, to quote a commentator, ‘not 
that it is obvious to the reasonable man that an easement will be required to enjoy 
the property, but rather that a man with reasonable eyesight will be able to see 
that something in the nature of an easement has actually been exercised.’52 The 
emphasis in Wilcox was, rather, on what was required to ensure that a grantor did 
not derogate from his grant — admittedly a lease was involved, and that principle 
is familiar in relation to leases as well as implied easements. The Court of Appeal 
for New Zealand has approved and applied Wilcox.53
For its part, the (English) Court of Appeal has recently, after reproducing 
Thesiger LJ’s conditions in Wheeldon, re-stated the rule as follows:
The  two propositions which, together, comprise the rule (or rules) in 
Wheeldon v Burrows are con ned, in their application, to cases in 
which, by reason of the conveyance (or lease), land formerly in common 
ownership ceases to be owned by the same person. It is in cases of that 
nature that, in order to give effect to what must be taken to be the common 
intention of the grantor and the grantee, the conveyance (or lease) will 
operate as a grant (for the bene t of the land conveyed) of such easements 
47  As in Jonathan Gaunt and Justice Paul Morgan, Gale on Easements (Sweet & Maxwell, 18th ed, 2008), 
where at 145 a statement is made (or reproduced from Ward [1967] 1 Ch 194, 224f) that all reported 
cases of implied positive easements have been ‘continuous and apparent’, but then at 148 Borman 
[1930] 1 Ch 493 is cited. See also Thompson, ‘Case Note’ [1995] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
239, 240.
48  After writing this section, I was pleased to  nd a similar argument made by Anna Lawson, ‘Easements’ 
in Louise Tee (ed), Land Law: Issues, Debates, Policy (Willan, 2002) 87f.
49 This does not imply that earlier courts have not occasionally done the same thing, eg Hansford v Jago 
[1921] 1 Ch 322, 338; so have lower courts: see eg Kavia Holdings v Bevillesta [2006] NSWSC 633 (27 
June 2006), [9]; see also Ferris, above n 8, paragraph under heading ‘The Judgments’.
50 (1997) 43 NSWLR 4.
51 Ibid 16.
52 Aldridge, ‘Easements on Sub-Divisions’ (1966) 110 Solicitor’s Journal 938, 938.
53 Mikitasov v Collins [2008] NZCA 390, 29; application for leave to appeal dismissed: [2009] NZSC 1.
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over the land retained by the grantor as are necessary to the reasonable 
enjoyment of the land conveyed. But, because the principle is founded 
on the common intention of the parties, the easements necessary to the 
reasonable enjoyment of the land conveyed are those which re ect (and, 
following separation of ownership, are needed to give effect to) the use 
and enjoyment of the land conveyed at the time of the conveyance and 
while that land and the retained land were in the common ownership of 
the grantor.54
Admittedly the question of ‘continuous and apparent’ was not the subject of the 
appeal, but the omission of any mention of those criteria cannot be overlooked.
If the ‘apparent’ requirement may be gradually fading away as well, it behoves 
us to ask whether it should be saved, and what the purpose is of a requirement 
that an implied easement should ‘betray its presence, either by some indication 
of its existence or by its obvious use in connexion with the land’.55 The answer 
seems intuitively obvious: it is ‘a rule of conveyancing convenience which exists 
to facilitate the discovery of incumbrances.’56 It exists for the sake of notice.57
But is the answer as obvious as that? To whom is notice being given? It should be 
given, if at all, to the person who will be disadvantaged by the proposed easement. 
But that is the vendor of the property — the grantor — who, of all people, has the 
best means of knowing what easements exist and are currently in use. The person 
with little to no capacity for that — the buyer — also has no need for notice, for 
ex hypothesi the easements can only favour and not disadvantage him.
The concept of ‘continuous and apparent’ as a prerequisite for an implied easement 
was originally intended by Gale, in pre-Wheeldon days, as applicable both to 
implied grants and implied reservations.58 In that context it is not surprising 
that it made some sense, for it would give notice to purchasers of servient 
tenements that their purchase would be affected by an implied reservation. Now, 
however, it is clear that only absolute necessity will justify the imposition of an 
implied reservation, there is no symmetry between the requirements for implied 
reservations and implied grants. The requirement that an implied grant should be 
apparent has thus lost even the purpose of making the law tidy and uniform in the 
two  elds in which it was previously thought to apply.59
54 Kent v Kavanagh [2007] Ch 1, 21.
55 Alexander v Challenger [2010] EWHC 2301, [58].
56 Charles Harpum ‘Easements and Centre Point: Old Problems Resolved in a Novel Setting’ (1977) 41 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 415, 422; cited with approval in Bradbrook and MacCallum, above 
n 39, 100. 
57 Even though the Wheeldon doctrine is legal not equitable: McGrath (2006) 68 NSWLR 229, 245; 
Kitching v Phillips (2011) 278 ALR 551, 561 (‘Kitching’) (application for special leave to appeal 
refused: Transcript of Proceedings, Kitching v Phillips [2011] HCATrans 335 (9 December 2011)); 
Lyria Moses and Cathy Sherry, ‘Unregistered Access: Wheeldon v Burrows Easements and Easements 
by Prescription over Torrens Land’ (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 491, 495f, 501.
58 Gale and Whatley, above n 30, 49f, 52.
59 Cf Simpson, ‘The Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code Civile’, above n 28, 243f.
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One suggestion is that the notice requirement constituted by ‘apparent’
is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of non-derogation from grant 
which requires the parties to have had an expectation or intention that the 
right should be granted — only if a grantee is aware of a quasi-easement 
can they genuinely expect to receive it.60
This is an ingenious suggestion, but it will not do, for the grantee will as a rule 
have an expectation only that services will be provided to the land somehow, but 
may well not know how exactly they are provided and, in particular, whether 
an easement is necessary to provide them, and if so which one or more of 
the potential easements — and thus have no expectations on the need for any 
particular easement, which happens to be the point in issue. The grantee assumes 
that the grantor will not be permitted to derogate, but does not necessarily know 
how or in what way the non-provision of any and if so which type of easement 
might constitute derogation. This is because the grantee cannot always know how 
exactly hidden services such as sewerage and drainage are provided, nor even — 
assuming an apparent right such as a right of way is in question — whether or 
not there is some other legally assured access to the property which renders an 
apparent means of access redundant. If, on the other hand, the grantee does take 
the trouble to  nd out the unobvious ways in which easements are required for his 
purchase to be effective, he or she is to be congratulated on his thoroughness — 
but will no longer need Wheeldon at all, for he or she will stipulate for an express 
easement. Requiring notice of the very existence of a quasi-easement, therefore, 
will help only those who do not need help, and as far as the rest are concerned 
will often permit the grantor to derogate. Thus this suggestion for salvaging 
‘apparent’, at least, misses the mark.
Furthermore, notice is a concept which, famously, has no place in the Torrens 
system. Whatever the rules may be for determining whether a Wheeldon 
easement will bind a registered proprietor — and they vary among States61 — the 
Torrens legislation, supplemented by the standard equitable principles that have 
grown up relating to the enforcement of in personam rights (in the rare case when 
they are necessary), is the place in which they are to be found, not the Wheeldon 
rule itself. In the context of near-universal registration, which did not exist in the 
time and place where the Wheeldon rule was  rst enunciated, that rule should 
deal only with how easements arise as a result of transactions, not how their 
existence is recorded. The decision of the legislature of each State on the question 
of the relationship between unregistered implied easements and the register must 
take precedence over that of the Court of Appeal a century and a third ago. The 
Torrens system exists for the purpose of providing notice of interests, including to 
later purchasers from the original grantor, who are the most obvious parties who 
will need it — not the rule in Wheeldon.
60 Lawson, above n 48, 91.
61 They are described in Fiona Burns, ‘Implied Easements and the Integrity of the Torrens System’ (2009) 
21(2) Bond Law Review 1, 13–18; Moses and Sherry, above n 57, 500–6.
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This is certainly how the Court of Appeal for New South Wales saw the matter 
in McGrath v Campbell,62 in which both parties — the owners of the dominant 
and servient tenements — were, exceptionally, purchasers and the Wheeldon 
principle applied by virtue of simultaneous conveyances by one landowner to two 
separate purchasers. It was held that the indefeasibility provisions of the Torrens 
system were crucial in the determination that a Wheeldon easement did not bind 
the purchaser of the alleged servient tenement. This was based, of course, on the 
statutory provisions applicable in New South Wales. Each State has the right to 
adopt its own solution to this problem. Whatever solution a State adopts, there 
is no call to duplicate, by the principle of notice derived from the old law, the 
provisions of the Torrens system on the topic of the effect of unregistered interests 
on registered proprietors.
Only in relation to the few remaining pockets of old system land would it make 
any sense to retain any requirement that an implied easement should be apparent, 
as a means of giving notice; but this requirement would still be largely out of place 
in relation to implied grants, for notice will be required principally by the person 
who will be affected by them, the vendor, who usually has ample opportunity to 
discover the facts.
V  CONCLUSION
As has been pointed out on numerous occasions, the true basis of the Wheeldon 
doctrine is that a grantor must not derogate from his grant63 — ‘a principle w hich 
merely embodies in a legal maxim a rule of common honesty’.64 The basis of 
the Wheeldon doctrine is not the doctrine of notice which has been engrafted 
on it.65 This article has shown that there is therefore no place for ‘apparent and 
continuous’ alongside ‘reasonably necessary’: the former phrase came into the 
law by a historical mistake, is inconsistent with the purpose of the rule and indeed 
serves no other useful purpose at all.
62 (2006) 68 NSWLR 229.
63 A selection of recent statements by high-ranking courts to that effect is: Sovmots Investments v 
Environment Secretary [1979] AC 144, 168, 175, 183; McGrath (2006) 68 NSWLR 229, 242, 245; 
Kung Ming Tak Tong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 403, 426; Kitching (2011) 278 ALR 551, 559–61; Harpum, 
Bridge and Dixon, above n 35, 1248.
64 Harmer v Jumbil (Nigeria) Tin Areas [1921] 1 Ch 200, 225.
65 If anything this is only emphasised by the recent trend in New South Wales to stress the contractual side 
of Wheeldon, which is most apparent in McGrath (2006) 68 NSWLR 229, 242–6. This path appears to 
have been taken for the workaday reason given in Kitching v Phillips [2009] WASC 396, [72] (appeal 
dismissed: Kitching (2011) 278 ALR 551; application for special leave to appeal refused: Transcript 
of Proceedings, Kitching v Phillips [2011] HCATrans 335 (9 December 2011)). I do not analyse this 
trend here, but I am not sure that it is historically accurate or correct today — although there is clearly 
some degree of commonality in the general purpose behind Wheeldon and the basis on which terms are 
implied into contracts. It must be recalled, however, that it is not in all cases that a conveyance of land 
is produced contractually.
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The best option therefore is for this phrase simply to be deleted from the discussion. 
If that seems too bold a step, ‘or’ should be read to mean what it says, so that there 
is no need to prove ‘continuous and apparent’ in cases of reasonable necessity.
Another author,66 however, has proposed the opposite solution: deleting the 
requirement that the easement should be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment 
of the property and retaining ‘continuous and apparent’. The view is put forward 
that Re Ellenborough Park’s67 conditions for the recognition of an easement should 
be the test for implication instead. But that would overshoot the mark by some 
way: not every easement that could legally be created and happens to be visible 
should be imposed by the law in order to prevent the grantor from derogating. The 
point of Wheeldon is to prevent derogation and thus rescue a grant of land from 
pointlessness, not to convert all continuous and apparent quasi-easements into 
easements no matter how super uous they may be to the grantee’s needs after sale.68 
For example, the grantor might provide ample access to the road and completely 
obviate the need to use the path taken by the grantor when the properties were 
united, even though the path is still apparent. Philosophers remind us that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’; but ‘can’ does not necessarily imply ‘ought’. It is ‘continuous and 
apparent’ that is dispensable, not the requirement of reasonable necessity.
A further suggestion that has been made by one author and the Law Commission 
(England and Wales) amounts to the idea that ‘continuous and apparent’ should 
be downgraded from a requirement to a guideline to be used in determining the 
issue of implied grant.69 This article has suggested, however, that ‘continuous 
and apparent’ is not merely less central to the question of implied grant of 
easements than its current apparent status in the law might make it appear to be, 
but positively harmful to clear thinking on the topic, given that it poses a question 
about the grantee which should not be asked of him but can only be sensibly 
answered by the grantor, who will usually have other means of answering it 
anyway, and performs no other function in the law. Furthermore, a guideline 
would be a lazy compromise which leaves the status of ‘continuous and apparent’ 
barely clearer than it is now. Its fate should, rather, be oblivion — in accordance 
with the authorities already mentioned that ignore it.
66 Thompson, above n 47, 241f.
67 [1956] Ch 131.
68 Cf Lawson, above n 48, 89f. 
69 Nicholas Hopkins, Informal Acquisition of Rights in Land (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 213, citing a text 
which is not available to me; Law Commission, Making Land Work: Easements, Covenants and Pro ts 
à Prendre, Report No 327 (2011) 36, 196 (draft Bill cl 20(2)(b)); cf Northern Ireland Law Commission, 
Land Law, Report No 8 (2010) 155, which contains no such requirement.
